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I. INTRODUCTION
The question regarding the legal status of the embryo hinges
around a more conceptual —or, rather, more fundamental— legal
distinction, namely, the distinction between “things” and
“persons.” What is involved here is determining whether
embryonic human life is personal life and, thus, whether the
embryo has rights, or whether is it just the object of somebody
else´s rights.
This radical discussion becomes apparent in other more
technical and concrete debates about the relationship between the
value of human life and its stage of biological development, or its
viability perspectives. 1 The claim that the legal value of embryonic
life depends upon its stage of development and its viability
perspectives is, as shall be discussed later, one of the main
1. In statutory law, this claim has been performed by means of the much
discussed conceptual distinction between embryos and “pre-embryos” as can be
seen, for example, in Spanish legislation concerning the donation and use of
embryos (Ley No. 42, 1988) for therapeutic or scientific research use, and the
Law concerning assisted reproduction (Ley No. 35, 1988). For a critical review
of the ethical and legal implications of this conceptual distinction in American
Constitutional Law, see, e.g., Joshua S. Vincinguerra, Showing “Special
Respect” – Permitting the Gestation of Abandoned Preembryos, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 399, 405 (1999); and more recently, Robert Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses
and Babies: Treated as Persons and Treated with Respect, 2 J. HEALTH &
BIOMED. L. 33, 33 (2006).
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arguments in favor of the right to abortion in American
constitutional case law and, extensively, in favor of the right–and
sometimes duty–to discard embryos. This claim is grounded, at
least, on two normative propositions. According to the first one,
constitutional norms would admit the existence of legal
personhood only after birth, and/or would make the legal value of
non-personal unborn life depend on its viability. The second
proposition states that, in the light of the un-personhood of the
embryo, the constitutional principle of equality would not be
applicable to them.
As shall be described, Argentine constitutional case law
rejects—with some exceptions—those distinctions based upon the
contrary normative premises, according to which constitutional
principles admit the personal quality in each and every human
being from the time of conception, which is, in turn, set at the
moment of fertilization. On this basis, it is understood that these
same norms would recognize equal dignity in every person and
would proscribe making the legal value of human life–which is
always the life of a person–depend on the stage of development or
on the (chances of) viability inside or outside the mother´s womb.
Two mutually complementary analyses will be examined in the
next paragraphs. An Argentine and U.S. case law review will be
carried out in order to infer the arguments that have been posed in
both constitutional practices regarding the acceptance or rejection
of those conceptual distinctions (sections II & III).
This comparative approach is justified by the fact that, as it has
been insistently pointed out by various ius-philosophical schools of
thought, the abstract nature of constitutional language is an open
door to political, ethical, and philosophical assessments or, in
Rawlsian terms, to the “comprehensive conceptions” of those who
interpret and adjudicate law. In this light, although the arguments
for legal protection of embryonic life and the counterarguments for
a lack of legal protection of embryonic life arise in different
normative contexts, the creative nature of constitutional
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interpretation justifies the comparative approach propounded in
this review.
However, there is more to constitutional interpretation than
mere creativity. In order to be framed within a particular legal
practice, legal interpretation should confine itself to two kinds of
requirements. On the one hand, it should be coherent with the
values, goods or ends that should be common to all legal practices
in order to distinguish themselves from sheer violence. 2 On the
other hand, legal interpretation should conform to the way that the
particular legal practice within which it finds itself determines
those common values, goods or ends which are common to all
legal practices. This means that it should take into account the
semantic and syntactic rules that apply to the legal statements
under interpretation.
Creativity in interpretation operates, accordingly, within the
framework of two margins: the teleological one and the linguistic
or, more generally, the semantic one. These restrictions to
interpretative creativity also set logical limits to the transposition
of arguments from one constitutional practice, such as that of the
2. See PILAR ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD EN LA
INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA. UNA APROXIMACIÓN IUSFILOSÓFICA A LA TESIS DE
LA DISCRECIONALIDAD 65 (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2009; no. 142
in the ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS series) [hereinafter ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE
CREATIVIDAD]. Among the many authors who agree on the description of
interpretation as a comprehensive task which includes a creative dimension, not
to be confused with unrestricted discretion, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at Ch. I-IV (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); RONALD DWORKIN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE at Ch. I-VI (Clarendon Press 1985; RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 65-68, 411-413 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW. THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 10
(Harvard Univ. Press 1996); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 18-21
(Harvard Univ. Press 2006). For a critical review in Spanish language of
Dworkin´s proposal, see Pilar Zambrano, Objetividad en la interpretacion
judicial y objetividad en el Derecho. Una reflexion a partir de las luces y
sombras en la propuesta de Ronald Dworkin, 56 PERSONA Y DERECHO 281
(2007), and ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD 37-53. The most relevant
author insisting on the possible synthesis of creativity and objectivity in
interpretation, outside the English language field, is perhaps ROBERT ALEXY, A
THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 17 (Ruther Adler & Neil MacCormick trans.,
Clarendon Press 1989).
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U.S., to another, such as that of Argentina. Therefore, the benefit
of the proposed comparative analysis will depend upon the
adequacy of the questions that are posed. With these restrictions in
mind, the questions that this comparative study aims to answer are:
Which is the justificatory or teleological perspective of
interpretation assumed or postulated in each of these case law
practices? (Section IV B(1))
Which is the semantic theory underlining the whole
interpretative process in each of these case law practices? (Section
IV B(2))
Which of these teleological and semantic postulates best fit the
final aims or values of constitutional law? (Section V)
In the end, we aim to reflect upon the reciprocal influence
between these two margins of interpretation. Particularly, we
intend to test the coherence between, on the one side, the claim that
fundamental rights are deontological and, on the other, the
assumption of a constructive or criterial semantic theory of
language in the interpretation of the concept of legal personhood
(section V).
II. THE EMBRYO IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
Although the status of the embryo is not regulated by federal
statutory law, it may be induced from the federal Supreme Court
decisions concerning the issue of abortion that, as a whole,
establish the legal status of the unborn in its various gestational
stages. The leading cases in this line are the well-known Roe v.
Wade 3 and Casey. 4
A. The Value of the Embryo´s Life under Roe v.Wade
The famous case of Roe v. Wade, argued before the United
States Supreme Court, challenged a Texas criminal abortion statute
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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which penalized abortions in all cases, except when pregnancy
meant a risk to the life of the mother.
The District Court found the Texas Act unconstitutional in the
light of the 9th Amendment, which admits implicit rights stemming
from the U.S. Constitution, but denied the injunction that would
have allowed Roe to benefit from this unconstitutionality. Roe
filed for an appeal to have the original decision upheld, and to
obtain the injunction. 5
The Supreme Court analyzed Roe’s claim in the light of the
fundamental right to privacy, a right that, even if not explicitly
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, had been recognized by the
Court in previous cases as a necessary dimension of other liberty
rights that were explicitly recognized. 6 The Court, then, had to
decide whether the choice to abort was one of the dimensions of
that fundamental right or preferred freedom, what its extent was,
and to which constitutional clause it was related. These decisions
called for a previous determination as to the moment in which the
U.S. Constitution admits the existence of personhood in law. In
this sense, the Court asserted that:
The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a
“person” within the language and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of course,
collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. 7
The majority solved this interpretative question by denying the
fetus´s personhood on the basis of semantic, syntactic and
historical arguments. From both the semantic and the syntactic
points of view, it was argued that none of the constitutional clauses
define the meaning of the word “person,” and that each time such
word is used, it is with reference to human beings that have already

5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 122.
6. Id. at 153-55.
7. Id. at 157.
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been born. 8 From the historical point of view, it was stated that at
the time that the 14th Amendment was passed, and during most of
the nineteenth century, state legislation relating to abortion was
much more permissive than it currently was. This historical fact,
combined with the presumption that the authors of the Texas
legislation under review knew about this legal context, would
indicate that the constitutional drafters had no intention to include
the unborn as subject to the rights established in that Amendment. 9
Relying on these arguments, the Court concluded that the term
“person,” as used in the Constitution, does not apply to the
unborn. 10
Out of conceptual necessity, the denial of the personhood of
the unborn became the denial of the right to life before birth. But
this denial did not prevent the United States Supreme Court from
recognizing a legitimate state interest in the protection of
embryonic and fetal life, which was called “potential human life.”
Nevertheless, as the right to abortion had been recognized as a
“preferred freedom” or “fundamental right,” the constitutionality
of the rules regulating abortion in view of this interest depended on
whether or not they passed the strict scrutiny test: that is, the
requirement that the states justify both the compelling nature of the
interests at stake and the norms they are seeking to promote – i.e.,
that a compelling state interest exists, as well as the necessary
relationship between them. 11
Based on this, the Court recognized the already renowned
three-stage balancing of rights that is comprised of the right of the
mother to abort, and the two state interests that have been deemed
legitimate. 12 According to this three-stage concept, the Court
understood that it is only during the third trimester that the state

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 163-64.
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interest in the protection of the “potential human life” acquires
enough relevance so as to justify the criminalization of abortion.
B. Balancing the Right to Abortion and State Interest in Potential
Human Life
Regarding our object of interest, Roe’s conceptual inheritance
is that legal personhood is not recognized by constitutional text and
practice until birth, but, nevertheless, there is a legitimate state
interest in “potential human life” from the moment of conception.
Taking Casey 13 as a landmark case in post-Roe case law, the
balancing standards between the right of the mother to abort and
the state interest in potential human life were constructed around
the following issues: (a) whether states were or were not enabled to
set forth a legal duty that women perform fetal viability tests prior
to the abortive proceedings that were carried out during the second
trimester; (b) what was the constitutionally admissible content of
informed consent prior to abortive proceedings, and who had to
provide it; and (c) whether or not the states were enabled to
promote their interest in potential human life by means other than
prohibiting abortion during the first two trimesters.
Regarding the issue of compulsory fetal viability exams, the
Court issued contradictory statements, first banishing them and
then opening the way to them. 14 With varied grounds and a
crucially tight majority, the Court cleared the way in Webster,
affirming that state regulations could establish compulsory preprocedure medical viability tests independent from the trimester in
which the tests were ordered, under the sole condition that viability

13. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
14. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65
(1976), banishing State intrusion, and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-97
(1979), allowing it.
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was possible according to ordinary medical criteria and the exams
did not pose a risk to the mother’s health. 15
As to the content of informed consent, the Court found that any
state regulations aimed at deterring the mother from her decision to
abort rather than informing her about the risks involved in an
abortion proceeding were contrary to the Constitution. These
regulations were deemed to ignore the trimester scheme involved
in Roe, and were therefore deemed unconstitutional. 16
Finally, regarding the non-coercive use of the sovereign power,
the Court held, invariably—although on a tight majority―that the
states were not under an obligation to assign public funds to
provide abortions nor were they under an obligation to perform
abortive proceedings in public health institutions, even when either
of those choices implicitly promoted childbirth over abortion. 17
Along this line of thought, it was also held that a state could
lawfully establish that human life starts at conception in so far as
such statement did not have the practical effect of casting aside the
balancing trimester schema. 18
To sum up, as it was pointed out in the plurality opinion in
Webster, the Court had progressively become a kind of medical
committee, assisted by legislative powers, regarding the most
varied implications of abortive proceedings: establishing how long
of a waiting period prior to abortion procedures the law should set;
what issues had to be included in the informed consent and which
were to be excluded; who could provide the informed consent;
when was it legitimate to conclude that the fetus was viable and

15. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 515-21
(opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., White, J. and Kennedy, J.); 526 (concurring opinion
of O´Connor, J.); and 538 (concurring opinion of Scalia, J.) (1989).
16. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. (1983),
443-45; later confirmed in Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn.,
476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986).
17. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-79 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
18. Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 492 U.S. at 513.
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when was it legitimate to conclude it was not viable; what the
consequences were; etc. 19
Along this process, the function of the Roe tripartite schema
became blurred and increasingly murky. It was expected that it
would provide clear and precise criteria regarding the way in
which the state’s interests and the case law-based rights of the
mother to abort were to be balanced; however, only case law
dealing with informed consent stands as a seamless application of
the schema. The remainder of the questions posed before the Court
only succeeded in stretching the strings to the breaking point, as
was highlighted particularly in Webster, in which four judges
issued a dissenting opinion, 20 but no explicit majority was reached
because there were not five judges reaffirming or holding the
constitutional validity of Roe.
In addition to all this, the decisions of the Court were almost
always made, as in Roe, with an extremely narrow majority that
remained united at the level of the judgment, but at variance when
it came to providing the reasoning for the decisions. Disparate
grounds and miniscule majorities resulted in an unsurprisingly
complex set of rules that offered, to the law community in general,
and the states’ highest courts in particular, confusion instead of
clarity. This state of confusion was specifically acknowledged by
the majority in Casey, 21 and this is why it could be affirmed that
the cards were, in a way, reshuffled.
Indeed, in Casey, the Court revised both the tripartite temporal
schema and the rights and interests balancing criteria. Regarding
the schema, it was decided that the viability of the fetus outside the
mother´s womb, and not the length of the pregnancy (i.e., the third
trimester) is what established the point at which the state interest in
protecting “potential human life” becomes compelling enough to
19. Id. at 517-18.
20. Blackmun, J. and Stevens, J. issued dissenting opinions, and Brennan, J.
and Marshall, J. joined Blackmun, J.´s opinion.
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 944-51.
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legitimize a ban on abortion. Regarding the balancing criteria, it
was admitted that, even prior to viability, the state interest in
protecting and promoting potential human life is important enough
to enable the states to legitimately promote said potential human
life in an active manner, provided that this promotion did not
presuppose an obstacle or an undue burden on the exercise of the
right to abort. On these grounds, and contrary to prior decisions, it
declared that state measures aimed at discouraging the mother
from the decision to abort were constitutionally valid. 22
C. Some Conclusions
According to this review, it can be gathered that the value of
human life is not uniform according to the United States Supreme
Court case law regarding abortion, for it varies according to the
development stage that the fetus may have reached. Three different
stages can be individualized. The first would correspond to “nonviable potential human life,” which starts at conception and lasts
until the moment when the fetus is viable outside the mother´s
womb, with or without artificial assistance. The second stage
would correspond to “viable potential human life,” and it would
start at the beginning of viability outside the mother´s womb, until
birth. The third stage is personal human life, which starts at birth
and ends with natural death.
Embryos would fit into the first stage, “non-viable potential
human life,” and this is why they could be classified as an object of
a state interest, characterized by the United States Supreme Court
in the following manner:
It is optional for states to promote state or local interests in
potential human life.
As a state interest, it is not compelling enough so as to justify
the limitation of the mother´s right to obtain an abortion, but it is

22. Id. at 874-76.
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strong enough so as to justify compulsory measures aiming at
deterring the decision to abort.
The states can overtly favor the promotion of embryonic life,
as long as this does not pose an undue burden on the mother´s right
to abort prior to the moment of fetal viability outside the mother´s
womb.
D. The States’ Case Law on Embryos
The optional status of both the promotion and the
determination of the weight of the state interest in non-viable
potential human life—within the limits established by the Court—
becomes legally active, at both the federal and state levels, in a
fabric that is woven with the most diverse criteria regarding the
legal status of the embryo.
That status is defined by the states only on an exceptional
basis, as would be the case in the state of Louisiana. In the case of
the other states, as well as at the federal level, the status may be
inferred from the regulation of different activities that are directly
or indirectly related to the use or destination given to embryos
conceived in vitro. The most relevant of these activities are those
that have to do with assisted reproduction, and with the scientific
and technological research that requires using, and possibly
discarding, embryos. The embryo’s status will depend, essentially,
on the existence, or lack thereof, of limitations to embryo discard.
Only the legislation of the state of Louisiana and that of New
Mexico establish a ban on the sale, destruction or any other process
that does not involve embryo implantation for later development.
This establishes a duty of care and custody on those clinics in
which the embryos were created. 23 On the opposite side, states
such as California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and
23. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126; N.M. STAT. § 24-9A-[1][g]. For a comparative
study of these two statutes, see Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine is Mine but What’s
Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes that Mandate the
Implantation of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587 (2002).
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New Jersey expressly establish the duty of medical service
providers to inform the patient of the possibility of discarding
embryos that were not implanted. However, these same statutes
prohibit the sale or commercialization of the embryos, whatever
the final aim. 24 Other states, such as Oklahoma, take up an
ambiguous attitude: even if they only allow for heterologous
conception when performed with a reproductive aim, they omit
establishing the same limitation in the field of homologous
conception, and also fail to clarify what will be the final use of
those embryos that, even if conceived for a reproductive purpose,
were never implanted. 25
At the federal level, ever since the Clinton presidency, a ban
has been in place on the use of federal funds for the creation of
human embryos for research purposes or for research in which the
human embryos were destroyed, discarded or intentionally
subjected to a risk of damage or death greater than the risk allowed
in research involving fetuses inside the uterus (commonly known
as the “Dickey Amendment”). 26 This limitation was not extended
to include privately funded or state funded, research. However, in
March 2009, President Obama issued executive order 13505,

24. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125305; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a,
32d-32g; MD. CODE ECON. DEV. § 5-2B-10; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111L; N.J.
STAT. § 26:2 Z-2.
25. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 555. For a comparative synthesis of states’
legislation concerning assisted fertilization, see http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/genetics/embfet.htm (last visited Jul. 12, 2013).
26. This prohibition was not included in a specific statute concerning
scientific research on embryos, but was instead included, at the initiative of
Senator Jay Dickey, in the Balanced Budget Down Payment Act, I, Pub. L. No.
104-99, § 128(2), 1.10 Stat. 26, 34 (1996), and reapproved each year until 2009.
For a detailed and complete description of the federal politics concerning the
funding of the use of embryos in scientific research, see Monitoring Stem Cell
Research. A Report of the President´s Council on Bioethics, Washington D.C.,
January 2004, available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/
stemcell/ (last visited Jul. 17, 2013). A chronologic synthesis of American state
law concerning stem cell research can be found at http://ltiblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/lifting-ban-or-obfuscating-truth-bob.html (a pro-life
blog, last visited Jul. 12, 2013).
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which removed limitations on the use of federal funds for research
on new embryonic stem-cell lines. 27
Against this backdrop of complex, intertwined criteria,
constitutional case law at the state level has basically hinged
around the issue of who has the right to decide what the use of the
non-implanted embryos or pre-embryos will be, and with what
requirements, when there is no agreement between the parents in
this respect.
1. Davis v. Davis and Kass v. Kass
The leading case in this matter was Davis v. Davis, 28 a famous
case settled by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992. It involved
the fate of seven embryos that had been conceived by in vitro
fertilization. At the time when the progenitors divorced, the
embryos were kept under cryopreservation in the clinic in which
the progenitors had been given the corresponding treatment.
Initially, and contrary to the wishes of Mary Sue Davis, one of
the progenitors, that the embryos be implanted in her uterus, Junior
Lewis Davis, the other progenitor, wanted them to remain under
cryopreservation until he came to a decision regarding their use.
By the time the case reached the state Supreme Court, both parties
had changed their claims. Mary Sue wanted the embryos to be
donated to any couple that was willing to undergo fertility
treatment, insisting on the personal nature (personhood) of the
embryos. Junior Lewis wanted them to be discarded. Mary Sue´s
contention of embryonic personhood was accepted at the trial court
level, explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals, and, eventually,
by the state Supreme Court.
Apart from denying the personal nature of the embryos on the
basis of the Roe v. Wade ruling, the state Supreme Court also
denied that the state interest in “potential human life,”
27. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667 (Mar. 11, 2009).
28. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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acknowledged as legitimate and optional for states in Roe v. Wade
and reaffirmed in Webster, was compelling enough as to settle the
issue in favor of the implantation of the embryos. Relying on state
precedents, and on civil and criminal law regulations regarding the
fetus’ status when it is inside the mother´s womb, the Court
concluded that the State of Tennessee had no adopted interest
whatsoever in the “potential human life” of the un-implanted
embryos.
Therefore, the un-implanted embryos were not the object of
any state interest in potential human life, let alone persons. Even
so, the Court conceptualized a new category for embryos that
placed them in between property and personhood, to which a
special respect was owed given its potential to become a person. In
reality, this intermediate category was closer to property than to
personhood, for the progenitors´ rights on un-implanted embryos
were deemed “in the nature of a property interest,” and included
the right to decide on their disposal. 29
On these grounds, the Court set forth a principle of
interpretation, whereby whenever there is no agreement between
the parties, the courts should decide the matter by balancing the
opposing interests. Applying this principle to the case, the Court
set forth the rule in which the interest of one of the parties in
obviating fatherhood or motherhood (in this case, the father) is
stronger or greater than the interest of the opposing party (in this
case, the mother) in donating the embryos for future implantation.
Kass v. Kass 30 continued the development of state common law
in the matter of determining the use of un-implanted embryos
whenever there is disagreement between the progenitors. Unlike
Davis, here there was a prior written agreement that established
that if the parties became unable to agree on the use of the unimplanted embryos, they would be donated to be used in assisted
reproduction scientific research.
29. Id. at 596.
30. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
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Although this agreement between the clinic and the parties was
later ratified in the divorce decree, the woman asked that the
embryos be implanted in her, against the husband`s wish that the
agreement be executed. In all of the judicial proceedings, the
debate hinged on the correct interpretation of the agreement signed
between the parties and the clinic.
The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court that the agreement was clear that in event of
disagreement between the parties, the un-implanted embryos had
to be used for scientific research, and so decreed that the embryos
(described as pre-zygotes) be given for that use. 31
2. Will as the Ultimate Determinant of the Embryo´s Life Value
The binding nature of the common will of the couple, as
expressed in the covenants written by them or as agreed upon
between themselves and the clinic, was reaffirmed in Litowitz, 32
even when the parties subsequently agree to deviate from the
agreement.
In this case, what was at stake was the use of embryos that had
been conceived with the husband’s reproductive material, and an
ovule donated to the couple by a female third party. The agreement
between the Litowitzes and the clinic prescribed that, if the
embryos were not implanted within five years’ time after their
conception, the clinic should thaw them; in effect, destroy them.
Within a divorce context, and after the five-year deadline had
expired, both parties communicated their decision that the embryos
that were still frozen be implanted. The issue between the
divorcing parties was not whether or not they should be implanted,
but rather, in whom. Mrs. Litowitz wanted the embryos to be
implanted in her, and the ex-husband wanted the embryos to be
donated to another woman. The Washington state court did not
31. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.
32. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

113

provide a solution for this problem, for no proof had been
produced during the trial to show that the embryos were still alive.
Even so, the Court ventured to say that, even if their existence
were proven, their use should be regulated by the terms of the
agreement; i.e., they should be thawed (destroyed). 33
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the
female progenitor’s contention that the agreement signed by the
clinic and both of the progenitors, according to which, in case of
divorce, the embryos would be implanted at any of the parties’
request, be enforced. This Court relied, among other grounds, on
the theory that to compel a person to become a father or a mother
against his or her will was contrary to public policy, even if they
had contractually bound themselves to procreate. 34 This holding
was later reapplied by the Iowa Supreme Court In re Marriage of
Witten 35 and, by way of obitur dictum, by a Texas Court of
Appeals, in Roman v. Roman. 36
3. Some Conclusions
a. Un-implanted embryos are not conceptually persons, either
under federal or state constitutional case law. Nevertheless, they
are considered the object of “special respect” because of their
potential to become persons, which, although different from the
respect owed to personal dignity, must be differentiated from the
treatment that is owed to objects of interest or property rights.
b. The exclusive right of the mother to dispose of the embryo’s
life, acknowledged in Roe as a privacy right, only refers to
embryos that are already implanted in the mother’s womb. It
excludes un-implanted embryos, and therefore, the mother has no
right to obviate the father’s interests to implant or discard embryos
that are cryogenically stored.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 271.
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.2006).
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c. The use of un-implanted embryos is regulated, as a rule, by
the progenitors´ unanimous decision.
d. In case of disagreement, the written agreement prior to their
conception is binding, provided that it is unambiguous.
e. However, the agreement lacks binding force regarding
embryo implantation. In this respect, the present and concomitant
meeting of minds of both progenitors is required, both concerning
the fact of implantation and the body into which they should be
implanted. Therefore, either progenitor has “veto power” regarding
embryo implantation, be it in the womb of the mother or in that of
a third party.
f. “Special respect” does not mitigate in any way the meeting
of minds of the progenitors. It is only a relevant interpretative
criterion to be used whenever the use of the embryos must be
judicially settled, given a disagreement between the progenitors,
and in the face of a lack of a previous written agreement settling
the issue.
g. The “special respect” principle does not have enough weight
in the “counterbalancing” of interests as to make the embryo
implantation compulsory. On the contrary, in this
counterbalancing, the interest of one party in not producing a child
is heavier than the interest of the opposing party in gestating the
embryo or donating the embryo for implantation.
III. THE EMBRYO IN ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
The Argentine case law on embryos offers a rich range of
interpretations that seem to be firmly established. Young as this
judicial experience may be, this short time is not an obstacle to
reviewing the decisions issued by the Argentine Supreme Court,
which is the highest national court in the federal order, as well as
those issued by other Argentine courts.
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A. The Argentine Supreme Court (2001-2012): Tanus, Portal de
Belén and Sánchez 37
In Tanus 38 and Portal de Belén, 39 the Argentine Supreme Court
determined the sense and scope of the constitutional principle of
the fundamental right to life in relation to embryonic life. Both
judicial decisions, considered as a whole, give rise to the following
interpretative rule: this principle is binding in the case of embryos
with the same scope, as if it were the case of an already-born
person, and no differences based on its development stage or its
viability prospects shall be established.
In Tanus, the majority of the Court affirmed the appealed
decision, which had authorized the induction of labor of an
anencephalic fetus in a public hospital. When providing the
grounds for the decision, the Court pointed out that, even though
the authorization to induce labor had been requested in the 20th
week of pregnancy, by the time the case was to be decided by the
Supreme Court, the mother had reached the 8th month of
pregnancy. According to the Court, this temporal difference
allowed for the differentiation of childbirth by induction of labor,
on the one hand, and abortion on the other. It was argued that the
death of an anencephalic fetus outside the mother’s womb, when
the stage of extra-uterine viability is reached, is not to be attributed
37. On Mar. 13, 2012, in the leading case F.,A.L (CSJN, “F., A.L. s/ medida
autosatisfactiva,” Fallos 259: XLVI (2012)), the Argentine Supreme Court
issued a decision concerning women´s legal right to abort in case of rape.
Although this decision did not openly reject the assertions stated in Portal and
Tanus concerning the legal personhood of the embryos, it did put in question its
practical legal effects. It is therefore very likely that the case law era which
started with Tanus has come to an end with F.,A.L. The purpose of this study
being to compare the Argentine and the American case laws from the point of
view of their respective coherence with the conceptual features of fundamental
rights, this comparison only takes into account the era in which the former is
relevantly different from the latter. That is, the era which ended in F.,A.L and
goes from Tanus to Sanchez.
38. CSJN, “Tanus, Silvia c/ Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires s/
amparo,” Fallos 324: 5 (2001).
39. CSJN, “Portal de Belén - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro c/
Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social de la Nación s/amparo,” Fallos 325: 292
(2002).
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to the anticipated labor induction, but to the congenital condition
of the fetus.
Therefore, according to the Court, the case didn´t concern the
constitutional validity of abortion, but the way in which two rights
were to be counterbalanced: the mother’s right to health, and the
anencephalic fetus’s exercise of its right to life and to health.
Considering that in the eighth month, premature birth would not
alter the unavoidable death of the child, the Court understood that
inducing labor did not alter the essential content of the fetus’s right
to life or to health.
Leaving aside for the moment its logical validity, it should be
noticed that the Court´s reasoning asserted that the fundamental
right to life is in force from the moment of conception under the
American Convention for Human Rights, Law 23054, article 4.1.,
and under article 2, Law 23849, which affirms the Children’s
Rights Convention. 40
In Portal de Belén, the Court reaffirmed this normative
interpretation, further specifying that conception takes place at the
moment of fertilization. In stating this, the Court relied on the
opinion of different geneticists and biologists that “it is a scientific
fact that the ‘genetic construction' of the person is there [at the

40. “Tanus,” supra note 38, at cons. 11°. Art. 4 of the American Convention
for Human Rights states: “Right to life. 1. Every person has a right to her life
being respected. This right shall be granted by Law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. Nobody shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (the
translation is ours). In Spanish: “Derecho a la vida. 1. Toda persona tiene
derecho a que se respete su vida. Este derecho estará protegido por la ley y, en
general, a partir del momento de la concepción. Nadie puede ser privado de la
vida arbitrariamente” (Ley No. 23054, B.O. del 27/2/1984). Article 2 of Law
23849 states: “When ratifying the Convention, the following reserves and
declarations shall be stated: (…) In relation to article 1 of the Convention, the
Argentine Republic declares that it shall be interpreted in the sense that the term
“child” is understood to refer to all human being from the moment of conception
and until eighteen years old” (The translation is ours). In Spanish: “Al ratificar
la Convención, deberán formularse las siguientes reservas y declaraciones: (…)
Con relación al artículo 1º de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, la
República Argentina declara que el mismo debe interpretarse en el sentido que
se entiende por niño todo ser humano desde el moment de su concepción y hasta
los 18 años de edad” (Ley No. 23849, B.O. del 22/11/1990).
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time of conception], all set and ready to be biologically aimed,
because ‘the egg’s’ (zygote’s) DNA contains the anticipated
description of all the ontogenesis in its tiniest details.” 41
From a factual point of view, the Court considered it proven
that a contraceptive, the marketing and distribution of which had
been authorized by the national Ministry of Health and Social
Action, could operate under three subsidiary mechanisms.
Contraception could: (i) prevent ovulation, or (ii) operate as a
spermicide. Neither of these mechanisms posed a constitutional
objection from the point of view of the embryo’s right to life. In a
subsidiary manner, for the cases in which these two mechanisms
had not been successfully activated, the contraceptive challenged
in Portal would operate by (iii) modifying the endometrial tissue
and preventing embryo implantation. The Court found that this
subsidiary mechanism violated the embryo´s right to life. 42
Therefore, on the basis of these normative and factual
premises, the Supreme Court revoked the appellate court’s
decision, which considered it lawful for the National Ministry of
Health and Social Action to authorize the marketing and
distribution of the contraceptive under challenge.
After these decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
personhood of the nasciturus in Sánchez, 43 leaving aside any
considerations related to a hypothetical abortion. When
acknowledging the personhood, the Supreme Court qualified the
unborn involved in the case as “a person ‘to be born’, this is to say,
41. “Portal de Belén,” supra note 39, at cons. 7°.
42. Id. at cons. 9° and 10°.
43. CSJN, “Sánchez, Elvira Berta c/ M° JyDDHH – art. 6° L. 24411 (resol.
409/01),” Fallos 330: 2304 (2007), in which the Court provided a reminder that
article 30 of the Argentine Civil Code defines as “persons” all beings capable of
acquiring rights and contracting debts, and art. 63 extends the concept of person
to all unborn human beings who are conceived in the mother´s womb. Literally:
“[E]l art. 30 del Código Civil define como personas a todos los entes
susceptibles de adquirir derechos, o contraer obligaciones; mientras que el art.
63 señala como especie del género "persona" a las "personas por nacer,”
definiéndolas como aquellas que, no habiendo nacido, están concebidas en el
seno materno.” (cons. 9°).
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one of the juridical species of the ‘person genus’ under our civil
law . . . .” 44
B. Some Conclusions
The principles and rules acknowledged and established in both
rulings regarding the legal status of the embryo could be
summarized as follows:
1. Legal personhood is acknowledged, under Argentine
constitutional law, from the moment of conception.
2. Conception is deemed to happen at the moment of
fertilization.
3. Any action aimed at interrupting embryotic development
after the moment fertilization occurs should be banned, even when
this interruption is merely eventual or probable.
4. Therefore, the scientific debate regarding the distinction
between pre-embryos and embryos, or between viable embryos
and non-viable embryos, lacks legal significance.
C. Other Courts of Law and the Embryo
The case law of other courts regarding the legal status of the
embryo has primarily hinged on the debate over two different
series of issues: one is whether local birth control policies were
constitutional, and the other on establishing the use that should be
assigned to frozen embryos created during fertilization procedures.
The legal context on which both debates are centered involves,
primarily, local and federal statutes regulating sex and
reproductive health. Let us review that debate.
1. Birth Control Questions
The trend to regulate the fundamental or constitutional right to
health, especially as related to sexual and reproductive health, at
44. Id. cons. 11°.
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the local or provincial (state) level started in the 1990s and has
continued to grow ever since. Therefore, it is a process that started
some years before the 1994 constitutional amendment, and at least
a decade before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Portal
de Belén case regarding whether the birth control policies allowing
the disruption of implantation, or abortive methods in general,
were constitutional.
Nevertheless, all statutes issued before and after the 1994
constitutional amendment made the medical prescription and
provision of contraceptives dependent on the condition of their
non-abortive effect. The same condition is set forth in national
Law 25673, promulgated in 2002. 45 Although this law is
automatically applicable to health services subject to the federal
jurisdiction of the National Ministry of Health, it also empowers
the provinces to join the health program created by it. Thus, be it
effected directly or indirectly, local regulation of sexual and
reproductive health includes a general ban on abortive methods of
family planning.
Notwithstanding this ban, some of these norms, or the
regulations issued under them, allow contraceptive methods
regardless of the distinction between those which operate by
inhibiting fertilization and those which potentially inhibit the
implantation of the fertilized egg.
This lack of normative precision was subject to judicial debate
on different occasions after Portal de Belén. A conclusion that can
be drawn from this limited, and young, case law corpus, is that the
debate, at the local or provincial level, does not revolve around
embryonic personhood―an aspect that is never challenged―but
rather on the details regarding how to adequately weigh it against
the mother’s right to reproductive health. Primarily, the debate is
centered around the normative consequences of the scientific
debate regarding the anti-implantation mechanism assigned to
45. Ley No. 25673, art. 6°, B.O. 30032 (Oct. 22, 2002).
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emergency contraception and to the intra-uterine device, or to any
contraceptive that happened to operate, or could operate, by
obstructing the embryo’s development. Regarding this issue, the
different opinions are detailed in the following paragraphs.
2. A First Look at Portal: All “Emergency” Contraceptives are
Held Abortive
In Asociación Civil Familia y Vida, 46 a provincial court of San
Luis held that articles 1 and 2(c) of provincial Law No. 5344
regulating sexual and reproductive health, and article 4 of its
regulatory decree 127/2003, were contrary to the Constitution. The
first norm states that “the province of San Luis, by means of the
Ministry of Health, shall provide to the inhabitants who apply for
it, information, assistance and guidance for responsible
parenthood, in order to secure and guarantee the human right to
decide freely and responsibly about reproductive patterns and
family planning”. 47 The second establishes that medical providers
in public health assistance institutions should prescribe and provide
contraceptive methods. 48
The local Court understood that this normative plexus was
contrary to the Constitution because it failed to expressly exclude
the specific contraceptives that forestall implantation from the
generic provincial duty of prescribing, providing and inserting
contraceptives at public health facilities. 49 As grounds for this
argument, the local Court relied on the rule, ostensibly established
in Portal de Belén, in which any post-coital or emergency
contraceptive method is to be deemed abortive. 50

46. Cámara Civil, Comercial, Minas y Laboral Nº 2 de San Luis, “Familia y
Vida Asociación Civil c/ Estado Provincial s/ amparo,” Expte No. 18-F-2002,
del 21/3/2005.
47. Ley No. 5344, art. 1° (Prov. de San Luis, Oct. 30, 2002).
48. Dto. 127/03, art. 4° (Prov. de San Luis, Jan. 21, 2003).
49. “Familia y Vida Asociación Civil,” supra note 46, at cons. 3.3.
50. Id.
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3. A Second Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle
in Favor of the Embryo´s Right to Life
Similar to San Luis Law 5344, Córdoba Law 9073 establishes
and regulates the so-called “Responsible Motherhood and
Fatherhood Program,” 51 generically making the prescription and
delivery of contraceptives at health assistance centers depend on
their non-abortive effect. However, Law 9073 differs from Law
5344 because the former excludes from the compulsory list of
allowed contraceptives both emergency contraceptives and the
intra-uterine device. 52 And even if article 7 of Law 9073 allows
enforcement officers to add new methods of contraception, it
expressively states that these methods should coincide with those
previously approved of by competent national authorities.
It was thus not the local statute, but the way in which it was
enforced by the Executive Power, which included the free delivery
of the so-called emergency contraceptives at public health
assistance centers, that posed a constitutional problem. 53 The local
Court found this enforcement illegal and unconstitutional. Its
illegality was grounded precisely on the inconsistency between the
de facto application and Law 9073, article 6. Its unconstitutionality
was based almost exclusively on the principles and rules
established by the Argentine Supreme Court in Portal de Belén,
showing a partially different interpretation from that of the San
Luis Court of appeals.
The main difference between the two holdings lies on the
reasons for and the scope given to the rule by which emergency
contraception should be prohibited due to its abortive effect. As
51. “Programa de maternidad y paternidad responsables,” Ley No. 9073
(Prov. de Córdoba, Dec. 18, 2002).
52. Id. at art. 6°.
53. Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de 1a. Nominación,
sentencia no. 93, “Mujeres por la Vida - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro —
filial Córdoba— c/ Superior Gobierno de la Provincia de Córdoba s/ amparo ―
Recurso de apelación,” Expte No. 1270503/36, del 7/8/2008 (Majority: Justices
Mario Sarsfield Novillo and Mario R. Lescano. Minority (denying the
injunction): Justice Julio C. Sánchez Torres).
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stated above, according to the San Luis Court of Appeals, the
federal Supreme Court was said to have established, in Portal de
Belén, a kind of iure et de iure presumption that every post-coital
contraceptive operates via an anti-implantation mechanism. The
Córdoba court, on the other hand, is slightly more cautious. It does
not deny the scientific debate regarding the moment of
implantation, nor does it consider that Portal de Belén has
definitively solved its legal relevance. Rather, it establishes that the
existence of scientific doubt over the moment of fertilization is a
sufficient reason to justify the ban on emergency contraception,
and it does so by applying the pro homine principle. 54
4. A Third Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle in
Favor of the Woman´s Right to Reproductive Health
Holding a contrary view, other Justices have interpreted that
the pro homine principle should be applied in favor of the
woman´s right to reproductive health, and, therefore, it should be
unequivocally determined that an emergency contraceptive method
has an abortive or anti-implantation nature in order to justify its
prohibition. 55 Some other Justices have only required “sufficient
proof” that the method’s operation obstructs implantation in the
specific case in which it is prescribed, which does not necessarily
amount to certainty. 56
54. See opinion of Justice Sarsfield Novillo, who confirmed the majority’s
opinion, id. at cons. 11°.
55. Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial de 5ta. nominación de
Rosario, “Mayoraz, Nicolás Fernando c/ Municipalidad de Rosario,” Expte. No.
1455/02 del 18/06/08, cons. V.
56. See opinion of Justice Sánchez Torres in “Mujeres por la Vida,” supra
note 53, at cons. 15°. Some Courts dismissed on formal grounds challenges to
the constitutionality of decisions regarding sexual health and reproduction from
the point of view of the embryo´s right to life. See CSJN, “Morales, Rosa Nélida
s/ aborto en Moreno” Causa no. 2785, Fallos 319: 3010 (1996); CSJN, “P., F. V.
s/ amparo,” Fallos 328: 339 (2005) (authorization to induce the labor of an
anencephalic fetus). In another case it was ordered that an intra-uterine device
be inserted in a minor child, absolutely regardless of the question of its antiimplantation or abortive effects. See Cámara de Apelación en lo Civil y
Comercial–Sala I- La Matanza, “P. C. S. y C., L. A. s/ fuga del hogar,” Expte.
No. 167 / 1 Res. Def. No. 4/1, del 18/12/2001.

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

123

D. Embryo Status in the Debate Regarding in vitro Fertilization
Techniques
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Argentine Supreme
Court has not yet delivered an opinion on whether assisted human
reproduction techniques which, directly or indirectly, lead to
embryo discard―i.e., embryo destruction―are constitutional.
Even though many bills 57 have been proposed, the issue has not, to
date, been regulated by statutory Law. Nevertheless, the issue has
been debated and resolved in the judicial realm in different
instances.
1. Rabinovich
The first, and most well-known, judicial decision was issued in
Rabinovich 58 by the Civil Court of Appeals located in the city of
Buenos Aires. The case involved a series of measures aiming at
enforcing the right to life and health of embryos which, up to the
moment the judicial decision was issued, were held under
cryopreservation by public or private health institutions in the
aforementioned city. The judicial decision, issued unanimously,
was grounded in reasoning that was analogous, though not
identical, to that adopted two years later by the federal Supreme
Court in Tanus and Portal de Belén.
First, it was found that, from the point of view of Argentine
law, personal life starts at conception; this determination was based
on a systematic reading of all of the International Human Rights
Treaties and Conventions that take constitutional precedence under
article 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution. It was also found that

57. As an example, see file No. 4423-D-2010, Trámite Parlamentario 080
(22/06/2010), Régimen de Reproducción Humana Asistida y de Crio
conservación (Assisted Human Reproduction and Cryopreservation Regime),
registered by Silvana M. Giudici, Silvia Storni, Agustín A. Portela and Juan P.
Tunessi.
58. CNAC, Sala I, “Rabinovich, Ricardo David s/ medidas precautorias,”
Expte No. 45882/93, del 3/12/1999.
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the principle set forth in article 51 of the Argentine Civil Code, 59
according to which a person is every entity that may show
characteristic human features, has constitutional value.
But even though anyone may be considered a person for
constitutional purposes, the acknowledgement of the legal status of
the embryo requires determining the precise moment when the
lawful existence of every person starts. In order to resolve this
issue, the Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires applied article 4.1 of
the American Convention of Human Rights, 60 as the federal
Supreme Court would later do in Portal de Belén. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals, unlike the Supreme Court, paid heed to the
devaluation of the protection of the no nato that could be seen in
the expression “in general”, used in this norm. It decided this
particular semantic incidence by means of a systematic
interpretation that integrated this norm with the interpretative
declaration by Argentina on the occasion of the ratification of
Children´s Rights Convention, according to which, “child” is
defined as any human being as of the moment of conception. 61
The Court of Appeals, once again unlike the federal Supreme
Court in Portal, considered the logical possibility that the
declarations and reservations contained in international treaties
may not have the same hierarchical legal status as the treaty itself.
This possibility was neutralized by the phrase contained in article
75.22, Argentine Constitution, under which the treaties have
constitutional value “under their actual enforcement conditions”
(“en las condiciones de su vigencia”). Under the federal Supreme
Court precedents, this expression ought to refer to the conditions

59. Art. 51, Cod. Civ. states that “[A]ll beings who show signs
characteristic of human beings, without any distinction as to qualities or
accidents, are persons of visible existence.” In Spanish: “Todos los entes que
presentasen signos característicos de humanidad, sin distinción de cualidades o
accidentes, son personas de existencia visible.”
60. Cited in supra note 40.
61. Supra note 40.
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that effectively regulate the State’s obligations at the international
level. 62
As in Portal, it was asserted that conception takes place with
fertilization. Nevertheless, while in Portal the federal Supreme
Court grounded this interpretation almost exclusively on the
authority of embryonic science, the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Rabinovich was based upon a sort of normative slippery
slope argument. It stated that all arguments which link legal
personhood to the emergence of a particular event, such as the
moment of implantation, or the appearance of the nervous system,
or even birth, imply that the law doesn´t recognize an equal value
to all human life. 63
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the embryo and,
eventually, the monozygotic twins that emerge from the splitting of
the embryo, possess individual personhood. The Court also
decided the issue of the humanity and the legal personhood of the
pronuclear oocyte (i.e., an embryo at the stage that precedes the
fusion of the female and male gametes’ nuclei) in the following
way: the oocyte had to be dealt with, by law, in the same way as a
person, “not by virtue of asserting its personhood . . . but in the
light of the doubt that arises from the impossibility to exclude it
with certainty. [This doubt] . . . at the factual level, compels us to
respect its life and integrity, as if it were a person, a subject of law
enjoying those rights.” 64
2. Subsequent Cases
In three cases that arose after Rabinovich, the debate regarding
the embryonic legal status involved the parents´ claim that the

62. See “Rabinovich,” supra note 58, at cons. VI, citing CSJN, “Giroldi,
Horacio D. y otro s/ recurso de casación - causa n° 32/93,” Fallos, 318: 514
(1995).
63. Supra note 58, at cons. VI and VII.
64. Id. at cons. VII.
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social care institution (“obra social”) 65 they belonged to should
cover the costs involved in assisted fertilization treatment.66
Opinions delivered in these cases can be ranked incrementally
regarding the legal value of the embryo´s life, as follows:
a. The parents´ right to have in vitro fertilization procedures
covered by medical insurance is affirmed, fully bypassing the
problem of the use of un-implanted embryos; 67 or explicitly
eluding a decision on embryotic personhood on the basis that it
would be a religious question, alien to the scope of intervention by
the State; 68 or else rejecting the abortive nature of any fertilization
treatment, on the ground that, out of a conceptual necessity, it
cannot be considered abortive. None of these opinions referred
either to the Supreme Court precedent in Portal, or to
Rabinovich. 69
b. The parents’ ‘right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure
covered by medical insurance is affirmed, and there is a proposal,
but without binding force, regarding the possibility of donating the
supernumerary or surplus embryos for their later implantation, or
alternatively, for their therapeutic use or experimentation. 70
c. The parents’ right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure
covered by medical care insurance is affirmed, but it is
65. Obras Sociales are health insurance/health care programs that are
primarily administered by trade unions for the benefit of the union members and
their families (although there are other types of obras sociales, such as those
administered by each Argentine province for workers in the public sector). They
are funded by compulsory payroll contributions by employees and employers.
66. Juzg. CAyT N°6 de la C.A.B.A., “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social de la
Ciudad de Buenos Aires,” 20/11/07, LL 2008-A, 148, El Dial AA439C
(reaffirmed by the CCAyT de la C.A.B.A.); Cámara de Apelaciones en lo
Contencioso Administrativo de San Nicolás, “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA,”
15/12/08, LL 2009-A, 408; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mar del Plata,
“Loo, Hernán Alejandro y otra c/ IOMA y otra,” 29/12/08, available at
http://www.cij.gov.ar (last visited Jul. 15, 2013).
67. See “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social,” supra note 66 (opinion of Justice
P. López Vergara).
68. See “S.A.F y A.H.A c. IOMA,” supra note 66, opinion of Justice
Schreginger, cons. 5°, joined by Justice Cebey.
69. See “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA,” supra note 66, at cons. 5° (opinion of
Justice Schreginger, joined by Justice Cebey).
70. See “Loo c/ IOMA,” supra note 66 (opinion of Justice Ferro).
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simultaneously held that legal personhood is recognized from the
moment of fertilization, and it is ordered that a guardian be
appointed to safeguard their physical integrity, considering the
precedent in Portal as valid and binding, and joining the opinion
delivered by the Court in Rabinovich, but not finding that decision
binding given the different jurisdictions involved, i.e., national and
provincial. 71
d. The parents´ claim that the infertility treatment be covered
by the social care plan is rejected on the basis that it represents a
clear threat to the supernumerary or surplus un-implanted
embryos´ right to life, as interpreted after the Portal decision. 72
IV. A COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS FROM THE TELEOLOGICAL AND
SEMANTIC POINT OF VIEW
If there is any value in the orderly review of judicial decisions
and the grounds for them, this doesn´t rely either on their
thoroughness or on their unattainable definitive nature. It relies,
instead, on the possibility of drawing comparisons and contrasts of
both legal practices regarding processes of conceptual construction
and determination, in the light of the claim that fundamental rights
are deontological, absolute and/or unconditional.
A. The “Practical” Legal Value of the Embryo´s Life Compared
1. It should be pointed out that U.S. constitutional judicial law
in the field of embryonic legal status is much older than the
Argentine one. It was only in 2001 that the first judicial decision
was issued in Argentina, while the first U.S. precedent, which set

71. Id. (opinion of Justices Tazza and Comparato).
72. See opinion of Justice Valdez, id. at cons. X and XI, especially cons. XI
in fine. After these cases were decided, the province of Buenos Aires’ legislature
passed Statute 14208, B.O. 26507 (Jan. 3, 2011), regulated by Dto. 2080/2011,
which classified human infertility as a disease, and therefore included in vitro
fertilization in the so-called “compulsory medical assistance plan”, according to
which both private and public health insurance plans should include the
treatment as a free service.
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forth the position of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the value of
unborn (“potential”) human life, was issued in 1973.
2. Under the American case law reviewed, the legal value of
human life is not uniform; it varies according to the stage of
development that an unborn human being has reached. Such stages
do not exist in the Argentine Supreme Court case law, which
considers that there is a genre (“persons”) that embraces the one
“to be born” from the moment of conception, and conception
occurs on the occasion of fertilization. Not distinguishing stages
implies that there is a ban on any action knowingly aimed at
interrupting, either in an eventual or probable way, the
development of the embryo after fertilization.
3. Embryos and pre-embryos in American case law fit in the
first stage (“non-viable potential human life”) and are subject to
state interest, according to the U.S. Supreme Court. This state
interest in the protection of human life is independent from the
interest that the holder of the right to life may have over his or her
own life. 73 This independence is particularly relevant in order to
73. This principle was applied forty-four years later as grounds for denying
a fundamental right to assisted suicide, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). The grounds for state
interest in human life are discussed in depth, both by those who approve of Roe
and those who oppose it. Among many others, see Alec Walen, The
Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 161, 178 (2005), who highlights the way in which this claimed
interest would threaten the rights stated in Roe for women. See also James Bopp
& Richard Coleson, Judicial Standard of Review and Webster, 15 AM. J. L. &
MED. 211, 216 (1989). The idea that states hold an interest in human life which
is not conceptually linked to personhood was particularly developed by Ronald
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,
59 CHICAGO L. REV. 381 (1992). This idea was then picked up by Justice
Stevens in Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 n.2; and in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 747. This same conceptual distinction is also present in other
constitutional practices, as is shown in the famous leading Spanish case decriminalizing abortion, T.C., s. no. 53/1985 at FJ5, B.O.E. no. 119, May 18,
1985. For an academic discussion of the plausibility of this distinction see
certain commentaries on DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, such as Gerard V.
Bradley, Life’s Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329
(1993); Alexander Morgan Capron, Philosophy and Theory: Life’s Sacred Value
- Common Ground or Battleground?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1491 (1994); Abner S.
Green, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994); Frances M.
Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95

2013]

SEMANTICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION

129

protect the life of citizens that have not, as of yet, acquired the
ability to express their own interests.
4. The state interest in non-viable potential human life is
compelling enough as to justify the binding nature of certain
measures aimed at discouraging the decision to abort, but no other
practical effect is attached to it. For, although under U.S. case law,
un-implanted embryos are said to not be included among property
rights, there is no restriction governing the progenitors´ will over
embryos where even the will of only one of the parties is sufficient
to legally justify their discard.
5. It is unarguable that judicial decisions issued in Argentina
recognize more legal value in embryonic life than those in the
U.S., which considers that legal value arises only once the time of
non-viability is passed. In Argentina, however, even if the limited
case law corpus in existence shows a generalized acceptance of the
general principle that embryonic life is personal life before and
after implantation, this uniformity disappears when it comes to
determining the constitutionality of rules and courses of action
which imply the potential or actual discarding of embryos.
6. In Argentina, the debate over the treatment owed to embryos
is primarily focused on the legal effects of fertilization methods
that could involve discarding embryos, and on the normative
consequences of the scientific debate regarding the antiimplantation mechanism of the emergency contraceptive and the
intrauterine device, or any other contraceptive that might operate to
prevent embryotic implantation.
7. The discussion over contraceptive and fertilization methods
in Argentina assumes—with or without reason, which is not
evaluated here—the normative premise that women have a right of

COLUM. L. REV. 160 (1995) (book review); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of
Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049 (1994) (book review); Tom Stacy, Reconciling
Reason and Religion: On Dworkin and Religious Freedom, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1994); and more extensively, Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A
Critique of his Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289 (1997).
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access to them. Courts differ in the way in which they weigh this
perceived women´s right with the embryo´s right to life, as
recognized in Portal de Belén, Tanus and Rabinovich. The
contraceptive methods debate is centered upon the weight and
sense of the pro-homine principle. In particular, it concerns how
much certainty this principle requires regarding the antiimplantation element of these methods. Alternatively, this
discussion does not arise from the U.S. case law, which, by
acknowledging the concept of “non-viable potential human life”
and by allowing for the disposal of the embryo itself, undermines
the primary assertion of that principle.
B. The Justificatory and Semantic Postulates Compared
Judicial debates regarding the legal status of the embryo will
continue unfolding and getting richer and richer, both on the U.S.
and Argentine scenes, as long as the social factors that trigger it are
present. Still, even at this early stage of development, this
comparative synthesis makes evident the unfolding of a semanticanthropological debate relating to the most radical conceptual
distinction in the world of law: that which separates things on the
one hand, and persons on the other.
The question at hand is to whom do we give the distinction of
person or subject of law, and why. But this question cannot be
resolved if there is no previously adopted viewpoint in relation to a
more abstract and thus more fundamental, semantic debate: how
are things classified in general in the world and, in particular, in
the legal world? Are conceptual classifications the result of a
reflexive, yet somehow explicit, social debate that the law is
destined to adopt, at least as long as there prior consent exists? Are
they an interested imposition of a social group that is picked up by
the law and clothed with its coactive force? Or are they something
similar to a representation of reality, which emerges before us
already classified, if not thoroughly, at least partially?
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Regarding the embryo´s legal personhood, these questions
could be restated in the following way: Do the constitutional
judicial practices here reviewed find the personal or un-personal
nature of the embryo as the product of some sort of social
construction, or do they view it as something already given to
understanding, as an ob-jectum? Which is the semantic theory
implied in the interpretative arguments used in both of the
practices here reviewed?
In what follows, we will address these issues by considering
three consecutive and intertwined levels of approach: (a) the
relation of interpretive arguments to moral and anthropological
justificatory stances of interpretation (section 1); (b) the semantics
grounding these anthropological and moral stances of
interpretation (section 2); and (c) an evaluation of the coherence
between the categorical nature of fundamental principles and these
semantic approaches to the concept of legal personhood (title V).
1. The Justificatory Perspective of Interpretation Compared
The main interpretative argument sustaining the denial of legal
personhood to the unborn in Roe was the contrario sensu
argument: if the constitutional text does not entitle the unborn to
legal personhood, then it should be excluded from this legal
concept´s system of reference. 74 But as it has frequently been
noted, this same constitutional text does not mention either the
right to abort, or even the right to privacy—of which abortion is
considered to be a concrete application. Facing the silence of the
constitutional text, there was space, at least from a logical point of
view, both to recognize and to deny legal personhood to the
unborn. 75 As was noted above, this interpretative argument
74. See supra notes 8-10.
75. Regarding the logical ambivalence of the contrario sensu argument see
GEORGE KALINOWSKI, INTRODUCCIÓN A LA LÓGICA JURÍDICA 177-79 (J.A.
Causabón trans., Eudeba 1973), and LUIGI LOMBARDI VALLAURI, CORSO DI
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 95-100 (CEDAM 1981). Regarding the feeble legal
grounds for neglecting constitutional personhood for the unborn, see, e.g.,
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advanced in Roe vs. Wade against the acknowledgement of the
legal personhood of the unborn was never revisited. All later cases
assume, as part of Roe´s holding, that all unborn life is not to be
considered “personal life” (and not even human life, but “potential
human life”). 76
The logical ambivalence of the interpretative argument shows
that the actual reason sustaining the majority´s decision in Roe—
and in the subsequent cases which assume without discussion that
the unborn is not a person according to the Constitution—is a
moral and anthropological conception of the person, which is
assumed as the obvious, and thus not explicitly stated, justificatory
point of constitutional practices. A moral conception according to
which the faculty for autonomy grounds the right to be treated with
“equal respect and consideration,” as assumed in the constitutional
concept of “privacy.” 77 And an anthropological concept of person,
by which it is this same faculty (autonomy) that distinguishes
human beings from other species.
Although the Argentine Supreme Court in Tanus and Portal
had to deal with much more explicit texts regarding the legal status
of the unborn (recognizing its legal personhood and a right to life
from the moment of conception), none of these texts explicitly
states the moment when conception takes place, nor which kind of
legal protection is due to the unborn. Perhaps aiming to profit from
the credibility of scientific discourse, the Argentine Supreme Court

Charles Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human
Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in the Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, at 361 (2006/2007); or Martin
Ronheimmer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in
a Constitutional Democracy: A Constitutionalist Approach to the Encyclical
Evangelium Vitae, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 158-59 (1998). In any case, even some
of those who approve of the decision in Roe notice that neglecting the
constitutional personhood of the unborn is a main dimension of the case´s
holding. See Jack M. Balkin, How Genetic Technologies will Transform Roe vs.
Wade, 56 EMORY L. J. 843-64, at 845 (2007).
76. See supra notes 13-22, 28-36.
77. This teleological assumption was explicitly stated in Casey, 505 U.S. at
852.
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in Portal based its interpretation concerning the moment of
conception almost exclusively on geneticists´ findings. 78
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the American Supreme Court
in Roe—and all the other Courts which relied upon this decision—
utilized the same scientific concepts and findings, and still
attributed to them different practical (moral and legal)
consequences.
The availability of these scientific findings for all of the
Courts—Argentine and North-American—dealing with the
embryo´s status shows the Argentine Supreme Court decision in
Portal was not only grounded in the scientific description of
human life, but also in the moral concept of “person,” from which
this scientific data was interpreted. For the main question being
posed to all of the Courts was not, “when does genetics situate the
appearance of a new human being?”, but rather the anthropological
and moral question, “when should dignity, and thus legal
personhood, be recognized in a new human being?” The
underlying reason sustaining the majority interpretative conclusion
in Portal is thus the concrete answer to this question: the reference
of the concept of dignity is co-extensive with the reference of the
concept of human nature, independent of the factual possibilities of
it being actualized.
2. Implied Semantics Theories Compared
The different legal status granted to the embryo in one
constitutional case law practice or the other is due not only, nor
primarily, to textual differences, but also to the use of different
moral conceptions of the person as teleological or justificatory
stances of interpretation. Stated in this way, it should be considered
if and how the Courts link this justificatory stance of interpretation
to the semantic meaning of the texts, and which are the epistemic

78. See supra notes 13-22, 28-36.
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and semantic theories implied in the use of these justificatory
stances. In fact, both questions are closely related.
Scientific, moral and anthropological approaches to the nature
and value of human embryos are explicitly passed over in
American case law concerning the legal status of the embryo. It is
as if Wittgenstein´s theory of “language games” had been radically
interpreted and the “legal game” had been taken to be completely
alien to other “language games” where the concept of personhood
was also the object of discussion, and particularly, where an insight
into an “outside” world seemed to be allowed.
This aspiration for the autonomy of legal language from other
fields of language, be it morals or science, discloses at least two
semantic assumptions. First, that the justificatory viewpoint of
interpretation is internal to the legal practice, and second, that the
frame of reference of legal concepts is absolutely determined by
their use within the practice. In effect, if the legal concept of
personhood bears no relation to the moral concept of the person, or
even to scientific findings about human life, it seems that the legal
concept is nothing more than a product of legal decisions. It is not
surprising, then, that arguments determining the legal value of the
embryo were always grounded on the way the Constitution “uses”
the concept of person; or on the presumed intention of the
Constitutional authors when using constitutional concepts; and on
the absence of precedents recognizing legal personhood in unborn
life, and thus, on the fact that the concept of legal personhood has
not yet been used in reference to the embryo. 79
This semantic assumption, by which the use of legal concepts
within the legal community is the only criteria for determining its
frame of reference, also seems applicable to the concept of “special
respect” that is owed to embryos as an intermediate category
between things and persons. In effect, this concept, introduced to
legal practice in Davis v. Davis, is not founded upon any insight
79. See supra notes 8-10.
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into the value of human life as considered from a natural,
metaphysical, or even a conventionally moral point of view. It is,
instead, exclusively grounded on a kind of extension of other legal
concepts, which have been used for a longer time. It is like a mix
of the concepts of “property,” “born human life,” and “unborn but
viable human life.” 80 And being a mix of all three, it has neither
the same significance nor, of course, the same legal force, as the
third of the three. That is why this “special respect” amounts to
less than nothing from a practical point of view, for if there is a
rule concerning the destiny of embryos, it is that they should be
discarded in case of disagreement between the progenitors.
Argentine case law is not as uniform as the American one in
the degree to which the connection is acknowledged between
different “language games,” and the semantic theory implied
therein. The metaphysical and moral perspectives of interpretation
do not seem clearly acknowledged in Portal and Tanus, where the
legal status of the embryo is asserted as a necessary conclusion
based on scientific and legal statements. 81 It is plainly stated in
Rabinovich, where, in the face of both the textual indeterminacy
concerning the embryo´s legal status and the fact of scientific
discussions concerning the moment when a new human being
appears, the Court of Appeals based its interpretation of the
embryo as a legal person on the moral and legal pro homine
principle. 82
In any case, this more or less open recognition that the legal
“language game” is connected to the scientific and moral ones
expresses both the conviction that legal concepts are not purely
constructed from the inside of the legal practice, and that
something exists prior to human social practices and language
which claims respect.

80. See supra note 30.
81. See supra notes 38-41.
82. See supra notes 58-64.
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is also clear that all of
the Argentine Courts complemented this attention to the biological
and moral nature of a human person with the actual use of the
concept itself within the legal practice, when interpreting the
concept of legal personhood. The role of use within the legal
practice was particularly relevant when the question was not to
determine the definition of legal personhood, but rather what the
legal consequences of recognizing the entitlement to legal
personhood are; or how the law should deal with scientific doubts
concerning the moment when fecundation takes place; 83 or the way
contraceptives operate. These questions were, in all cases,
approached with interpretative rules internal to the Argentine legal
practice, such as the principle of pro homine.
As mentioned above, not all Argentine Courts enforced this
principle with the same consequences. Some of them applied it in
favor of the mother´s assumed right to conceive children, and
others in favor of the life of the embryo. Two related explanations
can be advanced for this disagreement. In the first place, the
proposition referred to by the legal statement “pro homine” is not
at all evident or manifest. It is not evident if the principle is an
appropriate ground for determining who is entitled to its
protection, nor is it clear who should benefit when its enforcement
postpones another person´s claimed rights.
Second, precisely because of this lack of manifestation, its
practical significance differs according to the concept of justice
from which each interpreter determines the global and final
justificatory point of law. The more this concept of justice is
attached to privacy and moral autonomy, the less value is
attributed to the life of an embryo, which corresponds to less
entitlement to legal protection. On the contrary, the more the
concept of justice is attached to dignity as a universal and nonvariable claim of respect—related to the concept of moral
83. See “Rabinovich,” supra note 58.
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autonomy, but not to be confused with it—the more value is
attributed to embryotic life, resulting in a greater entitlement to
legal protection.
V. WHICH SEMANTIC THEORY SHOULD GOVERN LEGAL PRACTICE?
Two semantic strategies and conceptions underlie the two legal
practices compared here: a traditional, or “criterial,” semantics on
one side, and a sort of “light”—with ample space for social
construction—realist semantics on the other. The last question to
be posed is: which of these is more coherent with the categorical
and universal nature of fundamental rights?
The discussions regarding which is the semantic praxis that
better fits these features of fundamental rights are too ample to be
reviewed in this article. However, it seems appropriate, at least, to
point out that they lead us back to the basic choice that was stated
above, i.e., either the fundamental rights principles are social
constructions that precede and determine their own frame of
reference; or else their reference—some basic human good—
precedes and determines its meaning. 84

84. As is well known, the alternative between giving priority to reference
over meaning when determining the sense of concepts was stated and developed
in the field of Philosophy of Language by SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND
NECESSITY (Blackwell 1980), and Hillary Putnam, Meaning and Reference, 70
J. OF PHIL. 699 (1973). These theories were applied to the problem of legal
interpretation by Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2091 (2001), among
other works; and, with some differences, by NICOS STAVROPOULOS,
OBJECTIVITY IN LAW (Clarendon Press 1996), and David O. Brink, Legal
Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS
12-65 (Brian Leiter ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). For a critical revision of
these theories see Brian H. Bix, Can Theories of Reference and Meaning Solve
the Problem of Legal Determinacy?, 16 RATIO JURIS 281-95 (2003). Regarding
the limitative role of semantics in interpretation out of the English language
field, see, e.g., JERZY WRÓBLEWSKI, SENTIDO Y HECHO EN EL DERECHO 108
(Francisco Javier Ezquiaga Ganuzas & Juan Igartua Salaverría trans., Fontamara
2001; vol. 9 in the DOCTRINA JURÍDICA CONTEMPORÁNEA series), and Pilar
Zambrano, Los derechos ius-fundamentales como alternativa a la violencia.
Entre una teoría lingüística objetiva y una teoría objetiva de la justicia, 60
PERSONA Y DERECHO 131-152 (2009).
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If the meaning or concept of fundamental rights is exclusively
the product of a more or less controlled social construction, and
more importantly, if a construed meaning determines its own field
of reference, it would be extremely hard to predicate the
universality and absoluteness of fundamental rights principles. By
contrast, their extension as its categorical or absolute nature would
depend upon the will for a social construction of meaning to lead.
Some political philosophers supporting this constructive approach
to fundamental rights principles have openly admitted that it is
irreconcilable with their categorical and universal nature,
particularly when applied to the legal concept of personhood. 85
Others are much more reticent to admit this openly. Thus,
Ronald Dworkin has expressly rejected what he deems to be a
criterial semantic approach to law, according to which all legal
concepts—including the concept of law itself—are constructed
from inside the practice, with no other basis than the sheer fact of a
convergence of their criteria in use within the practice. Against this
claim, Dworkin contends that legal concepts are interpretative and
thus there is no need of fundamental convergence in their use. 86
Additionally, he has pointed out that legal and political concepts
are the product of a collective constructive practice in the light of
moral and political values and, in the end, in the light of a
substantive conception of what qualifies as a good life. In this
sense, he aims to distinguish himself not only from classical
positivistic approaches to law, which claim the neutral nature of
the constructive process of legal concepts, but also from Rawls’
Theory of Justice, which aspires to exclude “comprehensive
conceptions” from the constructive process of political values. 87
Ronald Dworkin’s answer to them both is that all interpretative
concepts are the product of a holistic constructive practice that
85. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 20 (expanded ed.,
Columbia Univ. Press 2005).
86. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 46; DWORKIN, JUSTICE
IN ROBES, supra note 2, at 12, 151.
87. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 2, at 160-61, 225-26.
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synthesizes natural, moral, legal, and political concepts. This
holistic account seems much more faithful to legal practice than
the “criterial one.” In effect, as has been shown above, both the
Argentine and the American Courts rely on a holistic approach to
the concept of legal personhood, no matter how much they both try
to disguise this fact.
Now, as we have previously mentioned, it is obvious that
criterial semantics implies a negative answer to the question of
deference to reality. But the opposite is not obvious. For the
question is not only to what degree are legal concepts related to
moral, political or natural concepts, but also, if anything exists
prior to the whole conceptual constructive process itself. To this
Ronald Dworkin would answer “no,” or better, “it doesn´t matter”:
the only basis for the whole constructive process is a “reflective
equilibrium” between coherence and conviction. 88 But this mix of
conviction and coherence is all that Dworkin claims for moral
objectivism.
There is no place in his theory—nor any need, according to
him—for self-evident or self-justified practical propositions, or for
the claim that these propositions bear any relationship with human
nature. 89 And it should be noted that although self-justified,
practical propositions are generally the object of moral and
political convictions, this is not always the case or, much more
importantly, their epistemic justification.
Now, without reference to self-justified practical propositions,
there is no critical instance with which to confront the whole
conceptual constructive process. 90 Instead, if reference leads the
88. Id. at 162.
89. Id. at 226-27, and Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better
Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 118 (1996).
90. Both the possibility of grounding moral and legal objectivity in selfevident practical principles, and the possibility of acknowledging a connection
between these principles and natural human ends, has constantly been defended
by the New Natural Law school of thought and, especially in the field of law, by
John Finnis. See, among many other works, JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS Ch. 23-24 (Clarendon Press 2011); and John Finnis,
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abstraction of meaning, when legal authorities construe intricate
and obscure meanings (as, in fact, they have already done in
relation to the legal concepts of “person” and “special respect”),
the reality referred to by these legal and moral concepts would
make clear that there is abuse in the use of language. For no matter
how much imperium courts may have to construct and reconstruct
concepts in the social sphere in general, and in the world of law in
particular, they lack the power to transform, and least of all to
deny, the referential frame of this construction. In other words, if
reference precedes meaning, then human or fundamental rights
principles and their characteristic universality—for each and every
one—and absoluteness, in all cases, would be invulnerable to the
abuses of language. 91
Having reached this stage of the discussion, it is worthwhile to
ask, one last time: which semantic practice better fits the
conceptual, and therefore the necessary, characteristics of human
rights? A practice that construes concepts from a vacuum, or a
practice that construes them from a grasp of reality? In this latter
case, how does the reality referred to by the concept of human
rights narrow the construction of the legal concept of person? Is it
not by imposing the only condition that its admittance be universal
for every man, and absolute in each and every situation?

Introduction to 1 NATURAL LAW at xi (John Finnis & Carolyn Dever eds.,
Dartmouth Press 1991; published as part of THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF
ESSAYS IN LAW & LEGAL THEORY series).
91. For an approach to the constructivist semantics that underlies the line of
cases following Roe, see John M. Breen & Michael A. Scaperlanda, Never Get
Out the Boat. Stenberg vs. Carhart and the Future of American Law, 39 CONN.
L. REV. 297, 304 (2006).

